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The Nature of 
Aboriginal Title 
BRIAN SLATTERY 
Introduction 
The concept of aboriginal title is an autonomous concept of Canadian 
common law that bridges the gulf between aboriginal land systems and 
imported European land systems. 1 It does not stem from aboriginal 
customary law, English common law or French civil law. It coordinates 
the interaction between these systems, without forming part of them. 2 
Aboriginal title is thus a sui generis concept-one that does not fit into 
pre-existing legal categories.3 
The unique character of aboriginal title is explained by the distinc-
tive history of aboriginal lands in North America during the formative 
era extending into the nineteenth century. This history can be divided 
into four phases: 
(1) the period prior to European contact, when aboriginal peoples 
were independent political entities with international title to their 
territories; 
(2) the period of contact, when European states launched exploratory 
voyages and issued Charters embodying territorial claims; 
Notes will be found on pages 27-33. 
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(3) the period of initial settlement, when permanent European colo-
nies were established and inter-European treaties were concluded, 
delimiting the boundaries of exclusive colonial spheres; and 
( 4) the period of imperial expansion, during which Crown suzerainty 
was gradually extended over aboriginal nations and a constitution-
al framework emerged that embraced both settler communities 
and aboriginal peoples. 
Before Europeans came to North America, the indigenous peoples 
of the continent were independent entities, holding international title 
to the lands in their possession.4 However, the map of North America, 
like that of Europe, was far from static. The boundaries between ab-
original groups shifted over time and groups migrated in response to 
such factors as war, epidemic, famine, dwindling game reserves, altered 
soil conditions, internal conflict and population pressure. Lands that 
were vacant at one period were later occupied. The identities of the 
groups themselves changed, as communities dissolved or coalesced 
and new ones emerged. 5 
Far from ending this fluidity, the arrival of Europeans often mag-
nified it, as novel technologies, diseases, alliances and trade opportuni-
ties upset existing balances of power and stimulated fresh forms of 
competition and conflict. For ~xample, the well-known wars of the Iro-
quois against their aboriginal neighbours in the seventeenth century 
were partly spurred by the European fur trade. The introduction of the 
horse and firearms to the Western plains gave rise to new and more 
mobile styles of life among the Western Indians, which ironically are 
often taken to exemplify traditional Indian culture.6 
The early territorial claims launched by European powers had little 
basis in reality and had no impact on the territorial rights of indigenous 
American peoples. Nor did the advent of Europeans have the legal ef-
fect of confining aboriginal peoples to the lands they happened to pos-
sess at the time of contact, or prevent them from acquiring new lands 
in the future. Most of the continent remained an area open to move-
ment and change, where the title of an aboriginal group rested on long-
standing possession or agreement with other groups, and territory was 
gained and lost by appropriation, agreement or abandonment. 
Nevertheless, the situation changed gradually as the colonial pow-
ers concluded treaties among themselves, sorting out their territorial 
claims inter se. While these treaties could not bind indigenous groups 
that were not parties, they had the effect of designating exclusive Eu-
ropean spheres of influence in America and progressively reduced ab-
original opportunities for wider international contacts. This was 
particularly true in the period following the Treaty of Paris in 1763, when 
The Nature of Aboriginal Title 13 
France and Spain withdrew from the eastern and northern sectors of 
North America, leaving Britain free to pursue its imperial enterprises 
there. Henceforth, the British Crown and its successors, the United 
States and Canada, asserted exclusive rights to maintain relations with 
the aboriginal peoples occupying the territories in question: in particu-
lar to conclude treaties with them, to secure suzerainty over them and 
to obtain cessions of their lam;ls. 
Restrictions on the cessioh of ah~riginal lands arose from another 
source. The English-style lanq! systems prevailing in the colonies had 
one common characteristic. They were based on the premise that title · 
to land, so far as the settlers were concerned, could only be secured by 
grant from the Crown or its deputies. It followed that private settlers 
could not gain title by simply settling on the land or purchasing it from 
the indigenous peoples. In theory, at least, this rule ensured that the 
Crown retained control over the pace and manner in which land was 
settled and that the Crown benefited from any revenues flowing from 
land grants. The restriction also helped to abate the fraudulent practic-
es that often tainted private purchases of Indian lands.7 
In various stages, the Crown made good its claims over the terri-
tories now making up Canada and brought aboriginal peoples under its 
protection. This process had several legal consequences for aboriginal 
land rights.8 First, ~p_d~r B.!itJsliJa~,_the_C_!own _gained the ultimate ti-
tle ~o the lands_ h~~4: by ab_o~iginal peoples, as it did-toaff iands .in newly 
acg_ui~d ~.§lo~i~U~-~r-~t()~i~s_._ ,This effect flowed-frorri tlie fot1dar charac-
ter of the British constitution, whereby the Crown was not only sover-
eign of the realm but also supreme landlord.9 Second, the territorial 
title of an aboriginal group became a communal title at common law 
that formed a burden on the Crown's ultimate title and gave the aborig-
inal group the right to the exclusive use and occupation of their lands 
for a broad range of purposes. Third, aboriginal title could not be trans-
ferred or sold to private individuals; it could only be ceded to the 
Crown. As just noted, this restriction stemmed largely from the feudal 
systems of tenure imported into the colonies and from a desire to pre-
vent fraudulent land transactions.1° Finally, under the shelter of aborig-
inal title, customary land systems remained in force within aboriginal 
communities and governed the relations of their members among 
themselves. 
Character of Aboriginal Ti tie 
The basic attributes of aboriginal title were identified in the leading 
case of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, decided by the Supreme Court 
of Canada in 1997.11 The case involved a claim by hereditary chiefs of 
the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples to separate portions of a tract 
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encompassing 58,000 square kilometres in northern British Columbia. 
Their claim was originally for "ownership" and "jurisdiction"; however 
by the time the case reached the Supreme Court of Canada, it had be-
come mainly a claim for aboriginal title. 12 
Strikingly different conceptions of aboriginal title were advanced 
before the Court. The aboriginal parties argued that aboriginal title was 
equivalent to an inalienable fee simple. By contrast, the governments 
of Canada and British Columbia maintained that aboriginal title was 
simply a bundle of particular rights to engage in specific culture-based 
activities on the land, or alternafely the right to exclusive use and oc-
cupation of the land in order to engage ii) such specific activities. 13 
These differing approaches merit closer examination. 
According to the aboriginal parties, aboriginal title was similar to 
a fee simple, which is the largest possible form of land title known to 
English common law. 14 Most lands held by private parties in Canada 
(outside Quebec) are held in fee simple. A person who holds a fee sim-
ple on land is for all practical purposes the absolute owner of the land, 
or at least as close to being absolute owner as English common law per-
mits. In theory, under the English doctrine of tenures, all lands owned 
by private individuals are held of the Crown, which has the underlying 
and ultimate title to the land. The main practical significance of the 
Crown's ultimate title is that the land reverts to the Crown if the owner 
dies without leaving an heir to the estate (a process known"as "es-
cheat"). The aboriginal parties argued that a group holding aboriginal 
title was the effective "fee simple" owner of its lands, with the right to 
use them for any purpose it saw fit. However, aboriginal title differed 
from a fee simple in one major respect: it could not be transferred to 
private parties but could only be surrendered to the Crown. 
The Canadian and British Columbia governments rejected this 
model and argued that aboriginal title was at best a bundle of particular 
aboriginal rights. This bundle would allow an aboriginal group to en-
gage in a range of specific activities on the land, and it might also give 
the group the exclusive right to use and occupy the land for those spe-
cific purposes. However, aboriginal title would not enable the group to 
use the land for any purpose it saw fit. The group would be limited to 
performing the particular activities forming part of the bundle. 15 More-
over, the group would have to show that each activity in the bundle was 
itself an aboriginal right-that is, an element of a practice, custom or 
tradition that was integral to the group's distinctive society at the time 
of European contact. 16 1 
So, according to the governmental argument, the content of ab-
original title was variable. It differed from aboriginal group to aboriginal 
group, depending on the group's cultural practices at the time of Euro-
·.:.: 
' 
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pean contact. By contrast, the aboriginal parties argued that the con-
tent of aboriginal title was uniform and did not depend on historical 
practices. If a group had aboriginal title, it could use the land as it 
wished, subject only to the rule prohibiting transfers to third parties. 
In its judgment, the Supreme Court rejected the governmental ar-
gument and adopted a position close to that advocated by the aborigi-
nal parties. The Court begins its analysis with the century-old St. 
Catherine's Millj_ng case, 17 where the Privy Council famously character-
ized a5orfgfiial title as a "personal and usufructuary right." This per-
plexing formula had bedeviled the case law ever since, spawning 
unhelpful analogies with the concept of usufruct in Roman, French and 
even Scottish law. The Supreme Court takes the opportunity to give the 
formula a decent burial, observing that the Privy Council's choice of 
terminology was "not particularly helpful to explain the various dimen-
sions of aboriginal title. "18 So doing, the Court opens the way to a clear-
er and more accurate characterization of aboriginal title. 
Following in the footsteps of Justice Dickson in the Guerin case, 19 
the Supreme Court points out that aboriginal title is a sui.generis land 
right. As such, it is a unique right that does not correspond to the cat-
egories known to English common law or French civil law. Neither can 
it be understood simply in terms of aboriginal legal systems. It has to 
be viewed from both aboriginal and non-aboriginal perspectives.20 
Aboriginal title has three basic features that differentiate it from 
ordinary titles held under common or civil law. First, aboriginal title is 
inalienable. It cannot be sold or transferred directly to private third par- · 
ties. It can only be surrendered to the Crown, which in turn may grant 
it to third parties. However, the fact that aboriginal title is inalienable 
(and so "personal" to the holding group) does not mean that it is a non-
proprietary interest like a licence to use and occupy the land, which 
cannot compete on an equal footing with ordinary land rights under 
English or French law. 21 Aboriginal title is a true property right. In ef-
fect, then, the Court rejects the notion that alienability is a necessary 
feature of a property right. This notion stems from European property 
systems and has no application to aboriginal title. 
The second distinctive feature of aboriginal title is .. its. source. Un-
der English property law, all lands in the hands of private parties are in 
principle held of the Crown either mediately or immediately, by virtue 
of a legal fiction positing that the Crown was the original owner of all 
lands in the realm. 22 Influenced perhaps by this conception, the Privy 
Council in St. Catherine's had suggested that the source of aboriginal ti-
tle in Canada was the Royal Proclamation of 1763, issued following the 
cession of New France to Great Britain.23 However, this approach im-
plied that aboriginal land rights did not exist unless recognized by the 
·: 
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Crown. In Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court disclaims this approach and 
holds that, while the Royal Proclamation recognizes aboriginal title, it 
does not bring it into being. In the Court's view, aboriginal title arises 
from the prior occupation of Canada by aboriginal peoples, and from 
the interaction between the incoming common law and pre-existing 
systems of aboriginal law. In effect, aboriginal title stems from posses-
sion before the advent of the Crown. 24 
A third distinctive feature of aboriginal title is its communal na-
ture. As ~hief Justice Lamer explains: 
Aboriginal title cannot be held by individual aboriginal persons; it 
is a collective right to land held by all members of an aboriginal na-
tion. Decisions with respect to that land are also made by that 
community. 25 
Although the Chief]ustice does not elaborate on this point, it has sev-
eral important ramifications. First, any decision to surrender aborigi-
nal title to the Crown must be a communal one, made by the 
aboriginal group as a whole. It is not possible for a single individual or 
collection of individuals (such as a particular "chief' or "chiefs") to 
dispose of communal lands apart from group consent. The require-
ment of group consent is a uniform rule of Canadian common law that 
does not vary from group to group in accordance with local custom. 
This inference is supported by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which 
provides that Indian lands shall be purchased orily by the Crown "at 
some publick Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians." Moreover, as 
a matter of policy, it would be undesirable for the validity of a land sur-
render to depend on the vagaries of local customary law, which would 
often be unknown to the Crown parties and in any case might not con-
template land transfers. 
The communal character of aboriginal title has a second ramifica-
tion. The internal law of the group governs the manner in which group 
members share the land among themselves, unless this law has been 
modified by statute or other means. So, in effect, the concept of aborig-
inal title supplies a protective legal umbrella, in the shelter of which the 
cus~omary law of an aboriginal group may develop an~ flourish. 
__ ... - ··· ··A third ramification may be noted. Since decisions about the use 
and disposal of aboriginal lands must be made communally, there has 
to be some in!_e_n:ial mechanism for c01nmu_I!al_ qecision-ma~jpg. The 
need for such a mechanism is one of the cornerstories--ofthe right of 
self-government. At a minimum, an aboriginal group has the inherent 
right to make communal decisions about how its lands are to be used 
and by whom. As the Supreme Court observes: 
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the common law should develop to recognize aboriginal rights 
(and title, when necessary) as they were recognized by either de 
facto practice or by the aboriginal system of governance. 26 
In particular, the group has the right to decide how the lands are to be 
shared among group members; to make grants' and other dispositions 
of the communal property; to lay down laws and regulations governing 
use of the lands; to impose taxes relating to the land; and to determine 
how any land taxes and revenues are to be used and distributed. 
Scope of Aboriginal Title 
In Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court holds that the scope of aboriginal 
title is governed by two basic principles. First, aboriginal title confers a 
right to the exclusive use and occupation of the land for a broad range 
of purposes, which are not limited to the practices, customs and tradi-
tions of the group at the time of contact or any other historical period. 27 
Nevertheless, under the second principle, the uses that an aboriginal 
group makes of its land must not pe irreconcilable with the nature of 
the group's attachment to the lan&'Dn this point, aboriginal title dif-
fers from a fee simple, which allows the land to be used for any purpose 
whatsoever. Let us consider these principles more closely. 
1. Exclusive use and occupation 
Aboriginal title confers the right to the exclusive use and occupation of 
the land for a broad range of purposes. This explicit holding in Delgam-
uukw is the culmination of a series of observations made in previous 
Supreme Court rulings. Notably, in Guerin, justice Dickson held that 
aboriginal title is "a unique interest in land" which encompasses "a le-
gal right to occupy and possess certain lands,"28 which implies a right 
to use the land for more than traditional or customary purposes.Justice 
Dickson also held that the interest of an Indian band in a reserve is the 
same as aboriginal title in traditional tribal lands.29 So, the law govern-
ing reserve lands presumptively applies by extension to aboriginal title 
lands. Under s. 18 ofthelndianAct,30 reserve lands are held "for the use 
and benefit" of the band and may be used "for any other purpose for the 
general welfare of the band." Nothing in this section suggests that the 
band's "general welfare" should be defined narrowly in terms of aborig-
inal practices prior to European contact rather than the present-day 
needs of aboriginal communities. 31 
This conclusion is supported by the Indian Oil and Gas Act, 32 whose 
overall purpose is to provide for the exploitation of oil and gas on re-
serve lands that have been surrendered to the Crown. 33 In Delgamuukw, 
the Court holds that this statute presumes that title to reserve lands 
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includes mineral rights.34 Since aboriginal title is the same as reserve 
title, aboriginal title must also encompass mineral rights. In effect, 
lands held pursuant to aboriginal title may be exploited for their oil and 
gas in the same way as reserves--regardless whether or not this was a 
traditional use of those lands. The Court also quotes s. 6(2) of the In-
dian Oil and Gas Act, which provides: 
Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to abrogate the rights oflndi-
an people or preclude them from negotiating for oil and gas bene-
fits in those areas in which land claims have not been settled. 
The Court observes that the areas referred to in this section must in-
clude lands held under aboriginal title, since by definition these lands 
have not been surrendered to the Crown under treaties or land claims 
settlements. So, s. 6(2) presumes that aboriginal title permits the de-
velopment of oil and gas reserves. 35 
This conclusion is significant. It suggests that an aboriginal group 
may exploit the mineral resources on its lands without necessarily hav-
ing to surrender the lands to the Crown, so long as the process does 
not involve the transfer of land to third parties or sever the group's 
original connection with the land (as discussed below). In other words, 
although the Indian Oil and Gas Act envisages the surrender of reserve 
lands in order to facilitate their exploitation for oil and gas, there ap-
pears to be no reason in principle why such a surrender is necessary un-
der the common law of aboriginal title. 
2 . The inherent limit on uses 
In Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court holds that lands held pursuant to 
aboriginal title cannot be used in a manner that is "irreconcilable with 
the nature of the attachment to the land that forms the basis of the par-
ticular group's aboriginal title."36 If an aboriginal group wants to use its 
lands in a way that aboriginal title does not permit, it has to surrender 
the lands to the Crown and convert them into non-title lands.37 
The scope of this limitation has to be understood in light of its ra-
tionale. Chief Justice Lamer explains that aboriginal peoples have a 
special bond with the land, as evidenced by the central place that the 
land typically occupies in their cultures. For most aboriginal groups, 
the land is more than just a fungible commodity; it has an inherent and 
unique value quite apart from its economic value. The law of aboriginal 
title gives effect to that special bond by recognizing the importance of 
continuity in the relationship between an aboriginal group and its land, 
and the need for that relationship to endure into the future. As a result, 
uses of the land that would jeopardize that relationship are ruled out.38 
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In other words, aboriginal title does not permit uses that would defeat 
the title's fundamental basis and rationale, which is to preserve the 
land for future generations. An aboriginal group has the responsibility 
to ensure that its basic bond with the land is maintained. 
How can we determine which uses of the land are legitimate and 
which are illegitimate? The key lies in the nature of the aboriginal 
group's historic occupation of the land, as determined by the activities 
that have taken place on the land and the uses to which the land has 
been put, as well as by the group's traditional laws governing land.39 
The Court does not indicate what precise historical period is relevant 
in this context. However, since the Court later holds that aboriginal ti-
tle arises at the time the Crown gains sovereignty, it seems to follow 
that the basic character of the relationship is established in the period 
succeeding sovereignty rather than at the time of European contact. 40 
It bears remembering that a snapshot of aboriginal land uses at a single 
point in time is usually insufficient to capture the full range and depth 
of a group's ties with its land. A well-rounded account of that relation-
ship will normally have to draw on a relatively lengthy historical period 
that embraces the full range of climatic, ecological and other conditions 
with which a group has to cope. 
Unfortunately, the concept of an inherent limit on uses is open to 
misinterpretation. It could be read as reintroducing by the back door 
the concept of historically-based uses, which the Court has just reject-
ed. The Chief] ustice is clearly aware of this danger and goes out of his 
way to ward it off: 
This is not, I must emphasize, a limitation that restricts the use of 
the land to those activities that have traditionally been carried out 
on it. That would amount to a legal straitjacket on aboriginal peo-
ples who have a legitimate legal claim to the land. The approach I 
have outlined above allows for a full range of uses of the land, sub-
ject only to an overarching limit, defined by the special nature of 
the aboriginal title in that land.41 
The Chief Justice gives some concrete examples that help clarify 
his point. He notes that where an aboriginal group's historical occu-
pation was based on hunting the group cannot now use the land in a 
way that destroys its value as a hunting-ground, such as by subjecting 
it to strip-mining. Again, if a group's bond with the land is basically 
ceremonial or cultural, the group may not use the land in such a way 
as to sever that bond, as for example by turning the land into a park-
ing lot.42 What these examples show is that the inherent limit pre-
cludes uses that are completely incompatible with the original 
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relationship. However, the inherent limit does not rule out uses that 
are merely unfavourable to the relationship, so long as they do not de-
stroy it. Moreover, the inherent limit does not prevent part of the lands 
from being devoted to inconsistent uses, so long as the original rela-
tionship can be maintained on other portions of the land. The inher-
ent limit promotes an_3.Rp.r_apri.ate-balanc-.e--in-~he--U·Ses-0Ltlte_)~,!ld 
rather th~p _a._rigid adherence to--eriginal uses. This interpretation is 
'Support~d by the analogy that the Court draws with the English com-
mon law doctrine of "equitable waste." According to that doctrine, 
persons who hold a life estate in real property cannot commit "wan-
ton or extravagant acts of destruction" or "ruin the property." The 
Chief Justice explains that these sorts of limits capture what he has 
in mind here. 43 
In effect then, the inherent limit operates only at a very basic lev-
el. In most cases, it would not prevent an aboriginal group from put-
ting its lands to a full range of modern uses, so long as these uses do 
not destroy the land or prevent the group's elemental bond with the 
land from continuing. For example, a group that traditionally used its 
land exclusively for hunting, fishing and gathering might devote the 
land to a mix of residential, agricultural, dairy, commercial, industrial 
and resource-based uses, so long as these uses did not rule out the 
possibility of hunting, fishing and gathering in some sectors of the terri-
tory. It would not be necessary for hunting, fishing and gathering to be 
possible throughout the entire territory, for that would preclude most 
other uses. Nor would it be necessary for these traditional activities to 
be pursuable at the same level of intensity or with the same freedom 
as in former years. Clearly, the conversion of land to residential, agri-
cultural or industrial purposes may reduce the opportunity for tradi-
tional pursuits, and conservation measures may reduce that 
opportunity even further. However, so long as an aboriginal group en-
sures that some reasonable opportunity is afforded for traditional pur-
suits, the criterion will be satisfied. 
One important point emerges from the Court's two-fold analysis 
of aboriginal title. Under the first principle, aboriginal title is a uniform 
right, which does not vary from group to group. It gives aboriginal 
groups the right to the exclusive use and possession of their lands, re-
gardless of differences among groups in their historical patterns ofland 
use. In all cases, aboriginal groups are entitled to use the land for a 
broad range of contemporary purposes. Nevertheless, the second prin-
ciple introduces an element of historical particularity. An aboriginal 
group cannot use its land in a way that is fundamentally irreconcilable 
with its original relationship with the land, a relationship that may dif-
fer from group to group. 
The Nature of Aboriginal Title 21 
Aboriginal Custom 
What role does aboriginal custom play in this scheme? The answer lies 
in the fact that, while the doctrine of aboriginal title governs the rights 
of an aboriginal group considered as a collective unit, it does not regulate 
the rights of group members among themselve·s. The latter are governed 
by rules distinctive to the group, as originally laid down by custom.44 
· The doctrine of aboriginal title recognizes a communal title with 
certain general features. Apart from the inherent limit on uses, the 
character of this communal title is not governed by traditional concep-
tions or practices and so does not vary from group to group. However, 
the rights of individuals and corporate entities within the group are de-
termined inter se, not by the doctrine of aboriginal title, but by internal 
rules originally grounded in custom. These rules dictate the extent to 
which any individual, family, lineage, clan or other sub-group has rights 
to possess and use lands vested in the entire group. 45 While the rules 
have a customary base, they are not necessarily static. 46 They are open 
to both formal and informal change, in accordance with shifting group 
attitudes, needs and practices.47 
These considerations explain why a group may hold aboriginal ti-
tle at Canadian common law even if traditionally it had no notion of 
private land ownership. So long as the group satisfies the common law 
criteria for aboriginal title, it has a communal title to its lands. The fact 
that group custom does not acknowledge private ownership may be rel-
evant in determining the rights of individual group members, but it 
does not affect the title of the group as a whole. The same consider-
ations support the conclusion that aboriginal title is not confined to 
"traditional" uses ofland. 48 The doctrine of aboriginal title attributes to 
an aboriginal group a sphere of autonomy, whereby it can determine 
freely how to use its lands, so long as it does not sever its basic rela-
tionship with the land. Traditional conceptions may influence the 
group's decisions, but current needs and attitudes will likely play as 
strong a role. 
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Delgamuukw, some courts 
had expressed the view that an aboriginal group is permanently limit-
ed in its use of aboriginal lands to customary practices followed at a 
distant historical period, such as the time the Crown first acquired 
sovereignty.49 On this supposition, aboriginal title is like an historical 
diorama in an old-fashioned museum. Here, a smiling maiden strips 
birch-bark from a tree; there, a sturdy warrior aims bow and arrow at 
a mildewed deer; while in the corner, a youngster plucks plastic blue-
berries from a withered bush. We must, of course, disregard the next 
display, where a group of hunters plant their first crop of corn under 
the glassy eye of a black-robed missionary. If an aboriginal group did 
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not practise agriculture traditionally, it is now forbidden. The difficul-
ty with this conception, of course, is that aboriginal people are not 
waxen figures on display for tourists but living people who depend on 
the land for their livelihood. Any rule that would hold them in perma-
nent bondage to outmoded practices must be viewed with skepticism. 
The history-bound view apparently drew on English rules under 
which a party asserting a customary right must show that the custom 
has existed from "time immemorial" which, for curious reasons, is as-
sociated with the year 1189. However, the analogy is inappropriate. As 
we have seen, the doctrine of aboriginal rights is not based on English 
common law but arose in response to quite different historical condi-
tions in North America. Indeed, it would have been contrary to impe-
rial interests in America to confine aboriginal land uses to those 
existing at the time of contact. The European fur trade, which was cen-
tral to the development of Canada, depended on the activities of aborig-
inal hunters and trappers whose practices had changed considerably 
since pre-European times. 50 When colonial officials, in other contexts, 
urged certain hunting groups to take up farming, they were not sanc-
tioning an unlawful use of land. 
We must guard against the notion that aboriginal societies are es-
sentially static in nature, that the only true aboriginal land uses are 
those that were practised "aboriginally." In fact, of course, aboriginal 
societies have often been characterized by their ability to adapt to shift-
ing circumstances in a highly flexible manner. Without this flexibility, 
they would often have had little chance of survival.51 Significant chang-
es in aboriginal life-styles occurred in pre-European times, and further 
changes took place in response to European contact. Such adaptations 
did not entail the abandonment of a group's essential identity, any 
more than Europeans lost their identity when they adopted federalism, 
took up lacrosse or started cultivating potatoes, corn and tomatoes. 52 
The better view, then, is that taken by the Supreme Court in the Delga-
muukw case. Aboriginal title gives a group the right to the exclusive use 
and occupation of their land and the right "to use it according to their 
own discretion," 53 subject only to the need to maintain their basic link 
with the land. 
Aboriginal Title as a Property Right 
Aboriginal title is a true property right that may be maintained against 
the whole world, including the Crown. It is not held at the Crown's 
pleasure and it cannot be extinguished by a unilateral Crown act under 
the royal prerogative. 54 Where aboriginal title has been extinguished 
by valid legislation, it benefits from the common law rule requiring 
just compensation. 
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The royal prerogative consists of certain powers held by the Crown 
under the common law, which may be exercised apart from Parlia-
ment. 55 Prerogative powers should be distinguished from powers 
awarded to the Crown by statute. The legal character of a Crown act, 
such as an order-in-council or letters patent, depends on the source of 
the power to enact it. If the power stems from the common law, the act 
is a prerogative instrument. If the power is based on legislation, the act 
has the character of a statutory instrument. 
Where the Crown issues a prerogative grant with respect to land 
burdened by aboriginal title, the grant does not extinguish aboriginal 
ti~le. The Crown holds only an underlying title to aboriginal lands and 
cannot grant more than it possesses. To the extent that the grant pur-
ports to extinguish aboriginal title, it is ineffective. 56 Where the grant 
is based on statutory authority rather than the royal prerogative, its im-
pact on aboriginal title depends on such factors as the competence of 
the enacting legislature; the clarity of the legislative provisions; the 
terms of the grant; and the effect of such constitutional instruments as 
the Royal Proclamation of 1763, s. 91 (24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 
ands. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.57 
At one time, the effect of prerogative acts was less certain than it 
is today. 58 In St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen, the Privy 
Council said that Indian title held under the Royal Proclamation of 1763 
was "dependent upon the good will of the Sovereign."59 The statement 
was not explained and was not necessary to the decision. Nevertheless, 
it implied that Indian title was akin to a mere licence to use the land, 
which the Crown could unilaterally revoke at any time by prerogative 
act.60 However, in the Calder case,61 the Supreme Court moved in the di-
rection ofrecognizing aboriginal title as a full legal right. Although Jus-
tice Judson merely repeated the Privy Council's statement,62 Justice 
Hall adopted a well-defined position. He wrote: 
when the Nishga people came under British sovereignty ... they 
· were entitled to assert, as a legal right, their Indian title. It being a 
legal right, it could not thereafter be extinguished except by sur-
render to the Crown or by competent legislative authority, and 
then only by specific legislation. 63 
According to this view, aboriginal title could only be extinguished by a 
voluntary surrender or by legislation. By implication, it could not be ex-
tinguished by a unilateral exercise of the prerogative. 
This position was endorsed by the Supreme Court in the Guerin 
case. Justice Dickson stated that in Calder "this Court recognized ab-
original title as a legal right derived from the Indians' historic occupa-
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tion and possession of their tribal lands," and he noted that "Judson 
and HallJJ. were in agreement ... that aboriginal title existed in Canada 
(at least where it has not been extinguished by appropriate legislative ac-
tion) ... " 64 Justice Dickson also adopted the view that the Indians were 
"the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to 
retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion 
••• "
65 In her separate opinion,] ustice Wilson explicitly held that the In-
dian interest "cannot be derogated from or interfered with by the 
Crown's utilization of the land for purposes incompatible with the In-
dian title unless, of course, the Indians agree." 66 In an important pas-
sage, she observed: 
It seems to me that the "political trust" line of authorities is clearly 
distinguishable from the present case because Indian title has an 
existence apart altogether from s. 18(1) of the Indian Act. It would 
fly in the face of the clear wording of the section to treat that interest as 
terminable at will by the Crown without recourse by the Band.67 
It might be thought obvious that aboriginal title is a property right. 
Yet this conclusion has sometimes been doubted.68 Once again, the 
confusion stems in part from the St. Catherine's case, where the Privy 
Council, in an unfortunate phrase, described Indian title as a "personal 
and usufructuary right." 69 This statement could be taken as suggesting 
that aboriginal title is a right held in some personal capacity against the 
Crown rather than a property right. However, the Privy Council subse-
quently disavowed this interpretation in the Star Chrome case, where it 
explained that Indian title is "a personal right in the sense that it is in 
its nature inalienable except by surrender to the Crown." 10 In other 
words, aboriginal title is a "personal" right only in the sense that it is 
exclusive to the group that holds it and cannot be transferred to private 
individuals. 71 Nevertheless, it could be argued that the restriction on 
the transfer of aboriginal title prevents it from being truly proprietary 
in nature, since a property right is characteristically alienable. However, 
the argument is misconceived. While there may be grounds in English 
law for associating property with alienability, the two are not necessar-
ily linked. 72 In any case, aboriginal title is not a category of English land 
law but a sui generis right. As seen above, the restriction on alienability 
stemmed historically from the rule prevailing in settler communities 
that title to land flows from the Crown. This restriction is only partial, 
for aboriginal title may be ceded to the Crown and possibly also tooth-
er aboriginal groups. 
Properly understood, the St. Catherine's case stands for the propo-
sition that aboriginal title is a property right. The Privy Council held 
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that Indian title is an "Interest other than that of the Province" in lands 
allotted to a Province bys. 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867.73 Thus, the 
Crown in right of the Province holds only the underlying title to lands 
affected by aboriginal title until aboriginal title is surrendered to the 
Crown in right of the Federal Government, at which point the lands be-
come available to the Province as a source of revenue. As the Privy 
Council later observed, the phrase an "Interest other than that of the 
Province" in s. 109 denotes "some right or interest in a third party, in-
dependent of and capable of being vindicated in competition with the 
beneficial interest of the old province. "74 It follows that Indian title is 
an interest in land, independent of and opposable to the Crown's un-
derlying title, which it burdens. 
In Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Paul, 75 the Supreme Court removed any 
remaining doubts on the question. In a unanimous opinion, the Court 
stated: 
Before turning to the jurisprudence on what must be done in order 
to extinguish the Indian interest in land, the exact nature of that 
interest must be considered. Courts have generally taken as their 
starting point the case of St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The 
Queen (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C.), in which Indian title was de-
scribed at p. 54 as a "personal and usufructuary right." This has at 
times been interpreted as meaning that Indian title is merely a per-
sonal right which cannot be elevated to the status of a proprietary 
interest so as to compete on an equal footing with other propri-
etary interests. However, we are of the opinion that the right was 
characterized as purely personal for the sole purpose of emphasiz-
ing its generally inalienable nature; it could not be transferred, 
sold or surrendered to anyone other than the Crown. 
The Court went on to quote, with approval, Justice Wilson's statement 
in the Guerin case that the Crown cannot derogate from the Indian in-
terest in land unless the Indians agree. 76 
The fact that aboriginal title is an interest in land means that it 
benefits from the common law presumption favouring the payment of 
just compensation upon a compulsory taking. In the absence of clear 
words to the contrary, statutes that unilaterally extinguish aboriginal 
land rights should be interpreted as providing for compensation.77 The 
concept that aboriginal title is a compensable right is not a refinement 
of modern jurisprudence. It is intrinsic to the characterization of ab-
original title in the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Indian lands are defined 
there as "such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having 
been ceded to, or purchased by Us, are reserved to them .... " The Crown 
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provides that "if, at any Time, any of the said Indians should be inclined 
to dispose of the said Lands, the same shall be purchased only for Us, in 
Our Name, at some publick Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians 
to be held for that Purpose ... " These provisions portray aboriginal title 
as a valuable interest in land normally acquired by purchase, which in-
volves the payment of a monetary consideration. It follows that, where 
the Crown does not buy Indian lands for a mutually agreed price but 
expropriates them, the act will be governed by the normal presump-
tion requiring payment of just compensation. 
In Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court explicitly confirms this view-
point. In discussing the Crown's fiduciary duty under s. 35(1), Consti-
tution Act, 1982, the Court holds that aboriginal title has an inescapable 
economic aspect. As such, fair compensation is normally required 
when aboriginal title is infringed, depending on such factors as the na-
ture of the aboriginal title in question, the nature and severity of the 
infringement, and the extent to which aboriginal interests have been 
accommodated.78 Although the Court is discussing the implications of 
the Crown's fiduciary duty under s. 35(1), it appears that s. 35 (1) 
merely entrenches a common law duty that predated the enactment of 
the Constitution Act, 1982. 79 
In summary, the concept of aboriginal title is a distinctive concept 
of Canadian common law that coordinates the interaction between in-
digenous land systems and European-based land systems. Aboriginal 
title arises from the occupation of Canada by indigenous peoples prior 
to the advent of the Crown. It is a communal title and cannot be alien-
ated except to the Crown. It gives a group the right to the exclusive use 
and occupation of the land for a broad range of purposes, so long as 
these are not irreconcilable with the group's original bond with the 
land. While the concept of aboriginal title is broadly uniform in nature, 
it allows for differing systems of land use and tenure to operate within 
aboriginal groups. Aboriginal title is a true property right, maintainable 
against the whole world, including the Crown. It is not held at the 
Crown's pleasure and it cannot be extinguished by a unilateral exercise 
of the Crown prerogative. Where aboriginal title has been extinguished 
by the act of a competent legislature, it benefits from the common law 
presumption ordaining the payment of just compensation. 
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